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Federal Preemption of Arbitration
Southland Corp. v. Keating'
Arbitration agreements have traditionally been viewed with disfavor.
2
Many states have refused to enforce arbitration clauses to the same extent as
other agreements, either under the common law or by statute.8 This hostility
towards arbitration agreements was the result of an attempt to preserve the
courts' jurisdiction. Any agreement which deprived courts of jurisdiction was
frowned upon.' The United States Supreme Court recently held that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act5 (FAA) preempts state law and must be applied in state
courts. This decision is in accord with a trend throughout the nation to make
arbitration agreements specifically enforceable.6 The effect of the Court's
holding is to make arbitration agreements specifically enforceable nationwide,
in state as well as federal courts.7 This note will examine the preemptive effect
of the FAA on state substantive law and the implications for state procedural
rules.
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court invalidated a portion
of the California Franchise Investment Law8 which had been interpreted to
require judicial consideration of claims brought under it.0 Although the agree-
ments in question contained an arbitration clause, the franchisees brought ju-
dicial actions against Southland for fraud, misrepresentation and violation of
the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law." The
Court held that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to foreclose attempts
1. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
2. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Petition
of Pahlberg, 43 F.Supp. 761, 762 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 131 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.
1942); Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration- International and Interstate Aspects, 43
YALE L.J. 716, 719 (1934).
3. See notes 36-60 and accompanying text infra.
4. Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 406; Lorenzen, supra note 2, at 719.
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (formerly United States Arbitration Act).
6. 26 states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act [hereinafter cited as
UAA] since it was promulgated in 1955. See 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1984); Recent Devel-
opments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REv. 137, 139 n.4 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Recent Developments 1983]; Recent Developments 1984: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, infra [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments 1984].
7. See text accompanying note 104, infra.
8. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
9. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1982), rev'd sub. nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
10. 104 S. Ct. at 855.
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to limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements by the states.11 State law
contrary to the FAA violates the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution."'
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, found that in enacting sec-
tion 2 of the FAA Congress declared a "national policy" favoring arbitration
and "withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the reso-
lution of claims which the parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.11 3 Many
states already have legislation in place which provides that arbitration clauses
are generally enforceable.14 As a result of Southland, the quirks and idiosyn-
crasies of state arbitration laws have largely disappeared.
In addition to preemption, Southland presented the question of whether
arbitration under the FAA is impaired by state procedures allowing for class-
wide arbitration.'5 The California Supreme Court had devised this remedy to
alleviate any possible "class oppression" caused by the arbitration clauses in
question.' 6 The Southland Court dismissed this issue on jurisdictional
grounds.' 7
The Southland decision was not completely unexpected." Two Supreme
Court cases, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing. Co.,' 9
and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.Mercury Construction Co.,'0 had
hinted at preemption, but neither directly addressed the issue of whether the
11. Id. at 858.
12. Id.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 858. Chief Justice Burger has been an open advocate of alter-
native methods of dispute resolution, especially arbitration. See Burger, Isn't There a
Better Way? 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982); cf. Rehnquist, A Jurist's View of Arbitra-
tion, 32 ARB. J. 1 (1977) (defining proper role of judiciary versus arbitration).
14. See generally Recent Developments 1983, supra note 6. Recent Develop-
ments 1984, supra note 6.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 857.
16. See Note, Oppressive Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 71 CALIF.
L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1983).
17. 104 S. Ct. at 858.
18. Some state courts had held that the FAA preempts state law. E.g., Sentry
Sys., Inc. v. Guy, 98 Nev. 507, 509-10, 654 P.2d 1008, 1008-09 (1982) (per curiam);
Tennessee River Pulp & Paper v. Eichleay, 637 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tenn. 1982); North-
west Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 522, 523-24 (Minn.
1979); R. J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 363,
365, 642 P.2d 127 (1982); State ex rel. St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Donelson, 631
S.W.2d 887, 890-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Other state courts had held that the FAA
does not preempt state law. E.g., Ex parte Alabama Oxygen Co., 433 So. 2d 1158,
1161-67 (Ala. 1983), vacated sub nom., York Int'l v. Alabamba Oxygen Co., 104 S.
Ct. 1260 (1984) (remanded for further consideration in light of Southland); Pullman
Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334, 338 (Del. 1973); Kress Corp. v. Edw. C.
Levy Co., 102 Ill. App. 3d 264, 268-69, 430 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1981).
19. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
20. 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
[Vol. 1984
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FAA must be applied by state courts. Both contain dicta demonstrating the
Supreme Court's understanding of the FAA.
In Prima Paint the Court stated that it is "clear beyond dispute that the
federal arbitration statute is based upon ... the incontestable federal founda-
tions of control over interstate commerce."2 1 This language indicates that the
FAA is more than merely a matter of federal court procedure. In Moses the
Court stated "[faederal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs. . . in
either state or federal court." 2 Although the issue in Moses concerned the
propriety of a stay of judicial proceedings, the language used is a clear indica-
tion of the Court's understanding of the FAA.
The Southland majority was concerned about forum shopping between
state and federal courts. The Court stated that if the action "had been brought
as a diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would
have been enforceable."2 3 The Court felt that forum shopping would be en-
couraged if the FAA were not applied in state court. This rationale ignores the
structure of the FAA which provides that if federal subject matter jurisdiction
exists, either party can compel arbitration or stay a judicial proceeding in fed-
eral court.2 4 If federal subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither party
can go to federal court.2 Southland Corporation originally removed this action
to federal district court, but it was remanded back to the state court, presuma-
bly due to the lack of complete diversity.2 6
Southland will discourage forum shopping in the situation where an ac-
tion could be brought in two or more states. Under prior law, some states did
not enforce arbitration agreements or limited their scope. The forum chosen
by the party seeking a judicial resolution of the dispute could determine the
effect of an arbitration clause. After Southland, this will no longer be possible.
Where the contract involves commerce, an arbitration clause will be equally
enforceable in any state. This "national policy" favoring arbitration will ho-
mogenize the treatment of arbitration clauses by requiring all states to follow
Section 2 of the FAA.
Where both federal and state law purport to regulate the same conduct,
the issue arises: To what extent did Congress intend to preempt the field?2 7 In
Southland, Chief Justice Burger indicates that Congress intended to com-
pletely displace state law on the enforceability of arbitration clauses . 2 Where
21. 388 U.S. at 405.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 941.
23. 104 S. Ct. at 860.
24. 104 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. Id.; see text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
26. Note, supra, note 16, at 1240 n.6.
27. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-24 to 6-25
(1978); Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 369-89
(1978).
28. "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
19841
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Congress has decided to "occupy the field" for the federal government, state
regulation will be invalidated even though it comports with federal policies,"
but complete federal preemption should not be found unless congressional in-
tent to do so is clear. 80 It has been argued that Congressional intent is not
clear on this issue.81 Even Chief Justice Burger admits that the "legislative
history is not without ambiguities."8 2 This finding of preemption in the ab-
sence of a clear legislative intent goes beyond, and is inconsistent with, prior
case law."'
Though the FAA completely preempts state law on the enforceability of
arbitration clauses, state law may still apply in determining the procedures to
be used in enforcing arbitration agreements." Such state procedural rules will
be invalidated if they create an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the national policy favoring arbitration."8
The Court in Southland invalidated that part of the California Franchise
Investment Law" which had been interpreted to require judicial resolution of
disputes brought under it.'7 Because this statute hindered the enforcement of
arbitration provisions, it violated the supremacy clause." Many other states
have, either through legislation or court decision, burdened the enforcement of
arbitration clauses to a much greater extent than other contractual provisions.
Under the Southland decision, states are no longer free to require judicial
resolution of specified classes of disputes." States are also prohibited from
burdening the enforcement of arbitration clauses in other ways.4 0
The Southland Court was unequivocal in its holding that state law is pre-
empted. In enacting the FAA, Congress "withdrew the power of the states to
power of the states to require a judicial forum . . . ." Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 858.
29. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977); L. TRIBE, supra
note 27, at § 6-25.
30. L. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 6-25, at 384.
31. See Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 864-868 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (FAA not
intended to affect state court proceedings); Note, Federal Arbitration Act and Applica-
tion of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588, 594.
32. 104 S. Ct. at 859.
33. See L. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 6-25, at 384.
34. See notes 104-127 and accompanying text infra.
35. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co, 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones, 430
U.S. at 526; L. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 6-24, at 379; see also Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-152 (1963) (test is whether both regulations can be
enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field).
36. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (WEST 1977) (INTERPRETED IN Southland, 31
Cal. 3d at 598, 645 P.2d at 1200, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 368).
37. 104 S. Ct at 858.
38. Id. at 861.
39. See notes 44-56 and accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 1984'196
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require a judicial forum."' 1 Section 2 of the FAA was intended to "foreclose
state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments.""' The enforcement of arbitration agreements is not "subject to any
.. . limitations under state law.'
8
4
As an illustration of the extent of preemption, consider the federal Securi-
ties Act which provides that an agreement to arbitrate future controversies
arising under the Act is void."' Many states have followed this lead in enacting
and interpreting their securities laws.' 5 The California Supreme Court had
drawn an analogy to the federal Securities Act in interpreting the California
Franchise Investment Law to require judicial resolution of disputes.' Under
the reasoning of the Southland Court, the states are prohibited from making
the same exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration clauses as those made
by the federal government.' 7
Many other types of state statutes purport to limit the use of arbitration
to settle disputes in a given area. For example, Massachusetts law provides
that a consumer's remedies for breach of an implied warranty may not be
modified and that any attempt to modify or exclude remedies for breach of
such warranties is unenforceable." Where the transaction involves commerce,
the FAA should supercede this statutory provision and allow a consumer's
remedies to be modified by a clause requiring arbitration of disputes.
Some states prohibit the use of an arbitration clause in an adhesion con-
tract.4" Insofar as these statutes limit the enforceability of arbitration clauses
more than other clauses in adhesion contracts, they do not survive the South-
land decision.
States have also denied the use of arbitration in claims sounding in tort.'
41. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 858.
42. Id. at 861.
43. Id. at 858 (emphasis added).
44. See Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953).
45. See, e.g., Kiehne v. Purdy, 309 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Minn. 1981); Young v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 434 So. 2d 369, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Geil
v. Corcoran, 623 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
46. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 599, 645 P.2d at 1202-03, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 368.; see
also Note, supra note 16, at 1241 n.12. But cf. Allison v. Medicab Int'l Inc., 92 Wash.
2d 199, 597 P.2d 380, 382-83 (1979) (en banc) (FAA preempts Washington Franchise
Investment Protection Act which assertedly required a judicial forum for resolution of
disputes).
47. See Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.1 1. ("The question in Wilko was not
whether a state legislature could create an exception to § 2 of the Arbitration Act, but
rather whether Congress . . . had in fact created such an exception.").
48. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1983).
49. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 679A.1 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.350 (Cum.
Supp. 1983).
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Where such disputes arise under a contract involving commerce with an arbi-
tration clause broad enough to cover them, arbitration will be available under
the FAA. Several states withhold enforcement of arbitration agreements in
insurance contracts.5 1 In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associ-
ation,5 the Supreme Court held that the business of insurance is not beyond
the reach of Congress under the Commerce Clause.58 Congress reacted to this
decision" by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act which provides that "[N]o
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law
enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
. ..unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . ."15
Because of this Act, it is not clear whether the FAA will preempt all state law
regulating arbitration in insurance contracts. Where state law does not pre-
clude arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not prevent the FAA from giving the clauses effect."6 The McCarran-
Ferguson Act would prevent the FAA from preempting a state statute that
prohibited arbitration under an insurance contract.
In addition to state statutes which forbid arbitration of specific subjects,
many state laws allow arbitration clauses to be enforced, but burden them to a
much greater extent than other contractual provisions. Where the FAA ap-
plies, it will preempt these statutes so that the enforcement of arbitration
clauses will not be hindered.
For example, three states require prominent notice of the binding effect of
arbitration clauses.5 7 Under the Missouri statute, a contract containing an ar-
bitration clause must include a notice, in ten point capital letters above or
adjacent to the signature line, that the contract contains an arbitration
clause.5 8 South Carolina and Texas require a notice typed or stamped on the
first page of the contract.59 To the extent that these statutes render arbitration
51. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401
(1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 802
(West Supp. 1982-83).
52. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
53. Id. at 553. This holding was a retreat from Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 183 (1868), which held that issuing an insurance policy was not commerce.
54. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). For a good discussion of the interpretation
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205, 210-30 (1979).
56. Cf. Miller v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 187 (1979)
(because state law did not preclude arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act does not prevent application of the FAA). '
57. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (Supp. 1983); S. C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a)
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1982); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-
83).
58. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
59. S. C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Law Co-op Supp. 1982); TEx. REV. CIv.
[Vol. 1984
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clauses unenforceable in the absence of a special notice, they must yield to the
federal policy of enforcing arbitration provisions in contracts involving inter-
state commerce.60
The FAA has been applied by the federal courts whether jurisdiction was
based upon diversity61 or a federal question." The FAA does not itself provide
subject matter jurisdiction to a federal court." An independent basis of juris-
diction must exist before a party may utilize the federal court system. 6 This
jurisdictional requirement becomes less important now that state general juris-
diction courts are required to apply section 2 of the FAA.
The Court found "only two limitations" to the enforceability of arbitra-
tion clauses in state court. 65 First, to be governed by the FAA, an arbitration
clause must be part of a written contract "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce" or a maritime transaction. Second, even if the contract satisfies
the first requirement, it may be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 6 1
The first limitation is derived from the limitations on Congressional power
under the commerce clause. If a contract which contains an arbitration clause
does not involve commerce or a maritime transaction, the FAA does not apply
in either state or federal court.6 8 Section 1 of the FAA defines commerce as
"commerce among the several States or with foreign nations.16 9
STAT. ANN. art. 224-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83).
60. Cf. Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 998-99 (8th Cir.
1972) (refusing to apply a Texas statute requiring that an arbitration clause must be
signed by the parties' attorneys before it is valid); Wydel Assocs. v. Thermasol Ltd.,
452 F. Supp. 739, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (FAA invalidates provision of Texas partner-
ship law that requires that arbitration agreements will not be binding unless all part-
ners so contract).
61. See, e.g., RPJ Energy Fund Management v. Collins, 552 F. Supp 946, 949
(D. Minn. 1982).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, 364 F.2d 705,
709 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed 385 U.S. 924 (1966).
63. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.9.
64. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Dorn v.
Dorn's Transp., 562 F. Supp. 822, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
65. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 858.
66. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). If the contract does not involve commerce or a mari-
time transaction, state law should be applied. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350
U.S. 198, 200-202 (1956).
67. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added).
68. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-02 (1956); Downing v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 124 Mich. App. 727, 732-33, 335 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1983) (per
curiam); Bryant-Durham Elec. Co. v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 42 N.C. App. 351,
356, 256 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1979).
69. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Congress specifically exempted contracts for employ-
ment of workers in interstate commerce from the application of the FAA. Id. Such
1984]
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Congressional power under the commerce clause has consistently been
held to be far reaching. 70 Indeed, in Wickard v. Filburn,1 the Supreme Court
held that a farmer who grows 23 acres of wheat intended wholly for consump-
tion on the farm is by virtue of that fact alone subject to regulation under the
commerce clause. Subsequent decisions have not restricted the potential reach
of the commerce clause.7"
The argument has been advanced that because Congress said "involving"
rather than "affecting" commerce in section 2 of the FAA, it intended a nar-
rower exercise of commerce clause power.7 3 The Supreme Court has already
rejected a narrow interpretation of "involving commerce" which would have
applied the FAA only to contracts between merchants for the interstate ship-
ment of goods. 74 Thus, Congress intended to exercise the full scope of its com-
merce power in enacting the FAA. The FAA should be broadly construed to
enforce arbitration provisions in contracts that touch upon interstate com-
merce, without drawing a distinction between contracts that "involve" com-
merce and those that "affect" commerce.
The second limitation is that arbitration clauses may be revoked upon
"grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 7 5
contracts are governed by the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1982).
70. See Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry into the Limits of Con-
gressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 187, 187-89
(1972) (Congress may regulate local conduct which in isolation has only a trivial effect
on interstate commerce if the cummulative effect of a class of conduct on interstate
commerce is significant). For a good historical discussion of the framer's intent, legisla-
tive power and judicial interpretation under the Commerce Clause, see Eule, Laying
the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425-37 (1982); O'Fallon,
The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REV. 395, 395-416 (1982).
71. 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 118 (1941) (congressional power over interstate commerce extends to those activi-
ties intrastate which affect interstate commerce).
72. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (construing
commerce clause power to reach wholly intrastate "loan sharking" activities); see also
L. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 5-5, at 236-37 (describing congressional power to regulate
intrastate activities).
73. Thayer v. American Fin. Advisors, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Minn.
1982); cf Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-97 (1974) (distinguis-
ing between activities which are "in commerce" for purposes of the Robinson-Patman
Act and activities which "affect commerce" for purposes of defining commerce clause
power).
74. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401 n.7.
75. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (emphasis added). See generally Note, Incorporation
of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1391 (1980) (de-
fining grounds which exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract and
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Special rules making only arbitration agreements unenforceable will no longer
be tolerated, but the Southland opinion states that a party may assert "gen-
eral contract defenses" to avoid enforcement of an arbitration clause.7 6 In en-
acting the FAA, Congress intended to place arbitration agreements on an
equal footing with other contracts.7 7
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,78the Su-
preme Court held that a court may look only to the validity of the arbitration
agreement itself, and not to the validity of the underlying contract. 79 Under
this "separability doctrine" the court must order arbitration unless the making
or performance of the arbitration agreement is in issue.80 Only issues which go
to the validity of the underlying contract are for the arbitrators to resolve.
Issues surrounding the validity of the arbitration clause are for the courts.
The crucial question in this area is: What are the grounds which exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract? One court has suggested
that "revocation" under section 2 of the FAA is synonymous with "rescission"
which is an appropriate remedy when a contract is induced by fraud, mistake
or duress. 81 Another court used the same reasoning but added the defense of
undue influence to the list.8 Still another court has held that the only grounds
for revocation which meet the requirement of section 2 of the FAA are condi-
tions which vitiate agreements ab initio.83
One avenue of avoiding enforcement of arbitration clauses has met with
some success. The addition of an arbitration clause may be a "material altera-
tion" under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207(2)(b)." A written confirma-
tion of an oral agreement will often contain an arbitration clause.85 If the
76. 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.l1.
77. id.
78. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
79. Id. at 404. The Court refused to consider a claim of fraud in the induce-
ment to the underlying contract.
80. Id. at 403. The Court in Prima Paint implicitly adopted this separability
doctrine from the opinion of Judge Medina in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dis-
missed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
81. Halcon Int'l, Inc. v. Monsanto Austl. Ltd., 446 F.2d 156, 159 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 404 U.S. 949 (1971).
82. World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir.
1965).
83. County of Middlesex v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
84. 1 U.L.A. 215 (1976).
85. See Comment, UCC 2-207: Boiler Plates and Arbitration Clauses, 30 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 143, 148 (1978); cf. Furnish, Commercial Arbitration Agreements and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 346-47 (1979) (advocating an
amendment to UCC § 2-207 to conform it to the separability doctrine and to avoid the
problem of arbitration clauses being a material alteration in the battle of the forms).
19841
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addition of the clause is a material alteration, the FAA does not apply because
the arbitration clause never became part of the contract.8 6 While some courts
have held that the addition of an arbitration clause may be a material altera-
tion,8 7 others have stated that the addition of an arbitration clause in a confir-
mation of an oral agreement constitutes a per se material alteration under
UCC § 2-207(2)(b).-
Lack of capacity makes a contract voidable. 89 Capacity goes to the "mak-
ing" of a contract and should, therefore, be an issue for the court to decide."0
The related question of whether one person has authority to bind another to an
arbitration agreement is for the court to consider. 91
The defense of waiver of the arbitration clause is problematic. One com-
mentator has divided waiver into three categories and suggested that some
types be decided by the courts and others by the arbitrators.," First, waiver
can mean the failure to comply with time restrictions in the agreement. Courts
have generally held that this issue is to be decided by the arbitrators. 93 Sec-
ond, waiver can be in the form of laches.' This has also been held to be an
issue for the arbitrators. 9 Third, waiver can be found because of participation
in a court proceeding." Federal courts have generally decided this issue them-
selves by determining whether a party is "in default" in proceeding with arbi-
tration under section 3 of the FAA.9
7
The defense of unconscionability of the underlying contract has been held
to be an issue for the arbitrators. 98 Similar issues arise with respect to the
86. See Supak & Sons Mfg. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir.
1979).
87. N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir.
1977); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1170 (6th Cir. 1972).
88. Supak & Sons Mfg. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135, 136 (4th Cir. 1979).
89. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8-1, at 230 (2d ed.
1977); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.4, at 216 (1982).
90. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967) (court should decide issues which go to the making of the agreement to
arbitrate).
91. N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Ind., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 1977).
92. Calkins, Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate, 37 ARB. J. 10, 16 (1982).
93. See Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1225
(2d Cir. 1980) (time-bar defenses to be decided by arbitrator); cf O'Neel v. National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1984) (statute of limitations is
for the arbitrators to decide).
94. Calkins, supra note 92, at 11.
95. Halcon Int'l, Inc. v. Monsanto Austl. Ltd., 446 F.2d 156, 163 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 949 (1971).
96. N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir.
1977).
97. See Calkins, supra note 92, at 13, 16.
98. Janmort Leasing v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1292
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); see Goldberg, Arbitration of Claims of Contract Unconscionability,
[Vol. 1984
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defense of illegality of the underlying contract. If the claim is unconscionabil-
ity of the arbitration clause itself, the claim should be decided by the courts."
Claims of impossibility of performance, frustration of purpose, or com-
mercial impracticability should never be decided by the court. These defenses
merely assert that a valid contract should not be enforced, they do not affect
the making or performance of the agreement to arbitrate. When faced with
these defenses, the court should order arbitration.
Justice Stevens in his separate opinion in the Southland decision argues
that the arbitration clauses in question were void as a matter of public policy
under the Franchise Investment Law. 10 He asserts that an agreement which is
void as against public policy is revocable at law or in equity,"" and should not
be enforceable under section 2 of the FAA. Chief Justice Burger responded to
this argument by pointing out that the Franchise Investment Law is not a
ground at law or equity for the revocation of any contract. It is only a ground
for the revocation of an agreement to forego the right to a judicial forum.10,
Allowing such state-made exceptions would "wholly eviscerate Congressional
intent to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other
contracts.' "o1
The Southland opinion is not entirely clear as to which provisions of the
FAA must be applied by state courts. The FAA requires that arbitration
clauses be specifically enforced by state courts.'" The difficult issue is whether
federal or state procedures control in an action to enforce an arbitration clause
under the FAA. 105 The majority opinion expressly stated that it did not hold
that sections 3 and 4 apply to proceedings in state courts. 1 " Section 3 provides
for a stay of a judicial proceeding which involves an issue referrable to arbitra-
tion.107 Section 4 sets out the procedures to be used in a proceeding to compel
56 N.D.L. REV. 7, 7 (1980) (asserting that claims of contract unconscionability should
be for arbitrators to decide).
99. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 (court may consider issues relating to the
arbitration clause itself).
100. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 863 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 861 n.l1.
103. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)).
104. Id. at 859. Justice O'Connor's dissent points out that common law jurisdic-
tions have enforced arbitration agreements in a few different ways, as for example,
with an award of damages. Id. at 869 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see N. D. CENT.
CODE § 32-04-12-(3) (Supp. 1983).
105. For a discussion of procedures under state arbitration acts, see Recent De-
velopments 1983 supra note 6 at 169-210; Recent Developments 1984 supra note 6.
106. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.10. Justice O'Connor understood the Court's
decision to require state courts to enforce § 2 rights using procedures that mimic FAA
§§ 3 and 4. Id. at 865 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
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arbitration.108 It is clear that section 2 is binding on state courts. 09 The Court
left unresolved the question of whether any of the other procedural sections of
the FAA are applicable in state court. Because of this ambiguity, it is uncer-
tain how much federal case law will be binding on the state courts. °
Sections 5 through 13 of the FAA contain procedural provisions.", Jus-
tice O'Connor argues that since the drafters spoke in terms of United States
District Courts in enacting the procedural portions of the FAA, the intent of
Congress was not to apply these provisions to state courts.,12 Before South-
land, a state appeals court held that although the substantive provisions of the
FAA apply to state courts, the procedural provisions do not. s The court held
that since FAA § 10, which specifies grounds for vacating an award, was di-
rected at a "United States court in and for the district wherein the award was
made," only a federal district court could vacate an award under section 10.
Consequently, the court concluded that state courts are without power to va-
cate awards under the authority of FAA § 10.114
A comparison of the FAA and the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) 118 is
useful because the UAA has served as a model for many state arbitration
acts."" The FAA is in many ways very similar to the UAA, but certain impor-
tant differences exist between the two.11 7 First, the UAA is not limited to
108. Id. at § 4. For example, service of notice is made in the manner provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Southland decision states that the Federal
Rules are not applicable in state court. 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.10.
109. See 104 S. Ct. at 858.
110. For a discussion of case law under the FAA, see Kreindler, Arbitration
Practice Under Federal Law, 18 FORUM 348 (1983); see also Janmort Leasing v.
Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (federal rules of con-
tract construction and interpretation govern under the FAA).
111. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (appointment of arbitrators); id. § 6 (application heard
as motion); id. § 7 (summons of witnesses, books, records or documents); id. § 8
(seizure of vessel in admiralty); id. § 9 (confirmation of award); id. § 10 (vacation of
award); id. § 11 (modification or correction of award); id. § 12 (notice, service); id. §
13 (papers required to be filed).
112. 104 S. Ct. at 864 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
113. Hilton Constr. Co. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 166 Ga. App.
40, 303 S.E.2d 119, affd on other grounds.251 Ga. 701, 308 S.E.2d 830 (1983).
114. Id. at 41, 303 S.E.2d at 120.
115. 7 U.L.A. 1 (1978).
116. See Recent Developments 1983, supra note 6, at 139.
117. The following pairs of sections from the FAA and UAA are essentially the
same: (1) UAA § 1, FAA § 2 (validity of an arbitration agreement); (2) UAA § 3,
FAA § 5 (appointment of arbitrators); (3) UAA § 1I, FAA § 6 (application to court
shall be by motion); (4) UAA § 7, FAA § 7 (compelling attendance of witnesses,
books, etc.); (5) UAA § 13, FAA § 11 (grounds for modifying or correcting an award);
(6) UAA § 14, FAA § 13 (force and effect of judgment confirming, correcting or
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transactions which involve commerce or maritime transactions. Second, the
two acts contain different provisions concerning their applicability to employ-
ment contracts. Section 1 of the FAA states that the FAA does not apply to
contracts of employment involving seamen, railroad employees, or workers en-
gaged in interstate commerce.11s The UAA specifically extends its coverage to
contracts of employment, unless the agreement provides otherwise.11 While
both the FAA and the UAA provide for summary proceedings to dispose of
issues relating to the making or performance of an arbitration agreement,120
the FAA provides that a party may demand a jury trial as to these issues," 1
the UAA does not.
Finally, both Acts have sections not found in the other. For example, the
UAA provides for stays of arbitration,"' while the FAA does not. The UAA
also establishes requirements for an award123 and permits arbitrators to
change an award, 12 4 neither of which is provided for under the FAA.
The procedures used to enforce arbitration clauses in state court must not
be inimical to the policy underlying section 2 of the FAA of placing arbitra-
tion clauses on the same footing as other contracts.'2 5 It remains to be seen
exactly which, if any, procedural provisions of state arbitration statutes, such
as the UAA, will be given effect in actions brought in state courts under the
FAA. One of the issues in the Southland case was whether the policies of the
FAA are impaired when a class action procedure is imposed on the process by
a state court.1 26 Consolidated arbitration has been allowed in federal court
under Federal Rule 42.127
By requiring state courts to apply section 2 of the FAA, the Supreme
Court has taken a significant step towards promotion of the use of alternative
methods of dispute resolution. When parties contract to resolve their disputes
118. FAA § 1.
119. UAA § 1.
120. FAA § 4; UAA § 2(A).
121. FAA § 4.
122. UAA § 2(b).
123. Id. at §8.
124. Id. at § 9.
125. 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.l1.
126. Id. at 857.
127. Robinson v. Warner, 370 F.Supp. 828, 830-31 (D.R.I. 1974). But see
Weyerhauser Co. v. Wester Seas Shipping Co., 568 F.Supp. 1220, 1221-22 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (Rule 42 is irrelevant, the real issue is whether consolidated arbitration was
agreed upon); cf Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 528 (1975) (state court power to consolidate
arbitration proceedings).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) makes the Federal Rules generally ap-
plicable to the FAA to the extent that the procedures are not provided for. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 81(a)(3). Section 4 of the FAA also refers to the Federal Rules. See FAA § 4.
The Southland opinion makes it clear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to state court proceedings under FAA § 2. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.10.
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by arbitration, their agreement will be specifically enforced. Antique state pol-
icies promoting the use of the court system will no longer be permitted to
undermine such contracts.
The Southland decision will not radically change the law in those states
already requiring enforcement of arbitration clauses. In states where arbitra-
tion clauses were disfavored section 2 of the FAA will require enforcement of
the agreement notwithstanding contrary state law. The Southland decision
may also alter the procedure to be followed in proceedings which relate to the
enforcement of arbitration clauses. Procedural rules which deny enforcement
of arbitration agreements should fall, just as substantive rules will. It remains
to be seen to what extent the procedural aspects of state arbitration statutes
will survive the Southland decision. Future decisions will further define the
role of the FAA in state court. Southland has given a strong indication of the
Court's understanding of the FAA and its relationship with state law. The
federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses will prevail and re-
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